Abstract. We consider the problem of logical data erasure, contrasting with physical erasure in the same way that end-to-end information flow control contrasts with access control. We present a semantic hierarchy for erasure policies, using a possibilistic knowledge-based semantics to define policy satisfaction such that there is an intuitively clear upper bound on what information an erasure policy permits to be retained. Our hierarchy allows a rich class of erasure policies to be expressed, taking account of the power of the attacker, how much information may be retained, and under what conditions it may be retained. While our main aim is to specify erasure policies, the semantic framework allows quite general information-flow policies to be formulated for a variety of semantic notions of secrecy.
Introduction
Erasing data can be difficult for many reasons. As an example, recent research on SSD-drives has shown that the low-level routines for erasing data often inadvertently leave data behind [29] . This is due to the fact that information on an SSD (in contrast to a more conventional magnetic hard drive) gets copied to various parts of memory in order to even out wear. The naive firmware sanitisation routines do not have access to the movement-history of data, and so leave potentially large amounts of data behind. This paper is not focused on low-level erasure per se. The requirement that data is used but not retained is commonplace in many non hardware-specific scenarios. As an everyday example consider the credit card details provided by a user to a payment system. The expectation is that card details will be used to authorise payment, but will not be retained by the system once the transaction is complete.
An erasure policy describes such a limited use of a piece of data. But what does it mean for a system to correctly erase some piece of data? One natural approach taken here is to view erasure as an information-flow concept -following [7] . To erase something means that after the point of erasure there is no information flowing from the original data to observers of the system. This gives a natural generalisation of the low-level concept of physical erasure to what one might call logical erasure. Logical erasure specifies that a system behaves as if it has physically erased some data from the viewpoint of a particular observer. The observer viewpoint is more than just a way to model erasure in a multi-level security context (as in [7] ). To understand the importance of the attacker viewpoint, consider a system which receives some data subject to an erasure policy. The system then receives a random key from a one-time pad and XORs it with the secret. The key is then overwritten with a constant. Does such a system erase the data? The answer, from an information-flow perspective, depends on what the observer (a.k.a. the attacker ) can see/remember about the execution. An attacker who can see the exact final state of the system (including the encrypted data) and nothing more, cannot deduce anything about the subject data, and so we can conclude that it is erased for that attacker. But if the attacker could also observe the key that was provided, then the system is not erasing. Different situations may need to model different attacker powers.
In practice the concept of erasure is a subtle one in which many dimensions play a role. This is analogous to the various "dimensions" of declassification [27] . In this paper we develop a semantic model for erasure which can account for different amounts of erasure, covering the situation where some but not necessarily all information about the subject is removed, and different varieties of conditional erasure, which describes both what is erased, and under what conditions.
The contribution of this work is to identify (Section 2) and formalise (Section 4) a hierarchy of increasingly expressive erasure policies which captures various dimensions of erasure. To do this we build on a new possibilistic informationflow model (Section 3) which is parameterised by (i) the subject of the information flow policy (e.g. the data to be erased), (ii) the attacker's observational power. This is done taking into account the facts that an attacker might be interested to learn, and the queries which he can or will be able to answer about the subject. This is a pre-print, extended version of the work which includes proofs. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
Erasure Case Studies
We consider a series of examples of erasing systems which differ according to the way they answer the following questions:
1. How much of the erasure subject is erased? 2. Under which conditions is erasure performed?
The examples are presented via simple imperative psudocode. We emphasise that the examples themselves are not intended to be realistic programs -they serve to motivate simply and intuitively various types of erasure policy that we will formalise in a more abstract setting in Section 4.
Total erasure
Consider a ticket vending machine using credit cards as the payment method. A partial implementation, in simplified form, is shown in Listing 1.1.
Line 1 inputs the card number; line 2 executes the payment transaction; line 3 writes the transaction time to a log for audit purposes; line 4 deletes the card number. This is an example of an erasing program: once line 4 is executed, the card number has been erased from the system. This statement can be refined further with respect to our original questions: 1) the system is totally erasing (no information about the card number is retained) and 2) erasure occurs unconditionally, since control flow always reaches line 4.
Partial erasure
Consider a variant of the vending machine (Listing 1.2) which logs the last four digits of the card number of each transaction, enabling future confirmation of transactions in response to user queries. The difference to Listing 1.1 is in line 3, where additional data is written to the log.
With this change, line 4 no longer results in total erasure since, even after cc number is overwritten, the last four digits of the card number are retained in the log.
Low dependent erasure
Consider a further elaboration of the vending machine example (Listing 1.3) which allows the user to choose whether the last four digits are retained. In line 3 the program acquires the user choice, then it either proceeds as Listing 1.2 or as Listing 1.1, according to the choice. Now the question about how much information is erased has two different answers, depending on the second user input. Since this dependency is not related to the erasure subject itself, we call this low dependent erasure.
High dependent erasure
Suppose there is a brand of credit cards, StealthCard, which only allows terminals enforcing a strict confidentiality policy to be connected to their network. This requires a further refinement of the program (Listing 1.4), since StealthCard users are not permitted a choice for the logging option. At line 3 the credit card number is inspected and, if it is a StealthCard, the system proceeds like 1.1.
Compared to the previous case, this example has an additional layer of dependency, since the amount of data to be erased is itself dependent on the erasure subject. We refer to this as high dependent erasure.
An abstract model of information flow
We formalise erasure policies as a particular class of information flow policies. In this section we define the basic building blocks for describing such policies. We consider trace-based (possibilistic) models of system behaviour and we interpret information flow policies over these models. We make the standard conservative assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the system model.
Our definitions are based directly on what an attacker can deduce about an erasure subject from observations of system behaviour. In this respect our model is close in spirit to Sutherland's multi-level security property of nondeducibilty [28] . However, we are not directly concerned with multi-level security and, in a number of ways, our model is more abstract than non-deducibility. For example, McLean's criticism [21] of nondeducibility (that it fails to incorporate an appropriate notion of causality) does not apply, since our notion of the "subject" of a policy is general enough to incorporate temporal dependency if required. On the other hand, our model is open to the criticism of nondeducibilty made by Wittbold and Johnson [30] with regard to interactive environment behaviours. Adapting our work using the approach of [30] (explicit modelling of user strategies) remains a subject for future work. A more radical departure from the current work, though still possibilistic, would be to take a process-calculus approach [15] .
Trace models
The behavioural "atom" in our framework is the event (in our examples this will typically be an input (?v) or output (!v) but internal computation steps can be modelled in the same way). Traces, ranged over by s, t, s 1 , t 1 , etc, are finite or countably infinite sequences of events. We write t.e for the trace t extended with event e and we write s.t for the concatenation of traces s and t. In what follows we assume given some set T of traces.
A system is considered to be a set S ⊆ T (the assumption is that S is the set of maximal traces of the system being modeled). Certain parts of system behaviour will be identified as the subject of our policies and we define these parts by a function Φ : T → D, for some set D (typically, Φ will be a projection on traces). For a confidentiality property the subject might represent the secret that we are trying to protect (an input or a behaviour of a classified agent). For erasure the subject will be the input which is to be erased.
Given a system S, we denote by Φ(S) the subset of D relevant for S:
We call this the subject domain of S. Let Sys(V ) be the set of all systems with subject domain V . Our flow policies will be specific to systems with a given subject domain.
Equivalence relations and partitions
The essential component of a flow policy is a visibility policy which specifies how much an attacker should be allowed to learn about the subject of a system by observing its behaviour. Following a standard approach in the information flow literature -see, for example [19, 26] -we use equivalence relations for this purpose. A flow policy for systems in Sys(V ) is R ∈ ER(V ), where ER(V ) denotes the set of all equivalence relations on V . The intention is that attackers should not be able to distinguish between subjects which are equivalent according to R. An example is the "have the same last four digits" relation, specifying that the most an attacker should be allowed to learn is the last four digits of the credit card number (put another way, all cards with the same last four digits should look the same to the attacker).
In what follows we make extensive use of two key, well known facts about equivalence relations:
-The set of equivalence relations on V , ordered by inclusion of their defining sets of pairs, forms a complete lattice, with the identity relation (which we denote Id V ) as the bottom element, and the total relation (which we denote All V ) as the top. -The set of equivalence relations on V is in one-one correspondence with the set of partitions of V , where each of the disjoint subsets making up a partition is an equivalence class of the corresponding equivalence relation. We write PT(V ) for the set of all partitions of V . Given P ∈ PT(V ), we write E(P ) for the corresponding equivalence relation:
In the other direction, given R ∈ ER(V ) and v ∈ V we write [v] R for the Requivalence class of v:
In the current context, the significance of R 1 ⊆ R 2 is that R 1 is more discriminating -i.e., has smaller equivalence classes -than R 2 . Hence, as visibility policies, R 1 is more permissive than R 2 . The lattice operation of interest on ER(V ) is meet, which is given by set intersection. Given a family of equivalence relations {R i } i∈I , we write their meet as i∈I R i (the least permissive equivalence relation which is nonetheless more permissive than each R i ).
The order relation on partitions corresponding to subset inclusion on equivalence relations will be written ER , thus
We overload the above notation for meets of partitions in this isomorphic lattice:
Attacker models and K-spaces
As discussed in the introduction, whether or not a system satisfies a policy will depend on what is observable to the attacker. We specify an attacker model as an equivalence relation on traces, A ∈ ER(T ). Note that this is a passive notion of attacker -attackers can observe but not interact with the system.
To compare what the attacker actually learns about the subject with what the visibility policy permits, we define, for each attacker observation O ∈ [A], the corresponding knowledge set K S (O) ⊆ V , which is the set of possible subject values which the attacker can deduce from making a given observation 3 :
, is the collection of all the attacker's possible (ie non-empty) knowledge sets when observing S:
Then the K-space of A for S covers V , by which we mean that every member of K S (A) is non-empty and
From now on, for a given V , we use the term K-space to mean any collection of sets which covers V . In the special case that a system's behaviour is a function of the subject, each K-space will actually define an equivalence relation on V :
When S is functional, the K-space K S (A), being a partition, can be interpreted as the equivalence relation E(K S (A)). So, in the functional case there is a straightforward way to compare a visibility policy with an attacker's K-space: we say that the policy R is satisfied just when R is more discriminating than this induced equivalence relation. Formally, when S is functional, S satisfies R for attacker A, written S ⊢ A R, just when R ⊆ E(K S (A)) or, equivalently:
We now consider how to extend this definition to the general case, in which a system has other inputs apart from the policy subject.
Comparing K-Spaces: facts and queries
In general, a system's behaviour may depend on events which are neither part of the policy subject nor visible to the attacker. In this case, the attacker's knowledge of the subject need not be deterministic, resulting in a K-space which is not a partition. This raises the question: when is one K-space "more discriminating" than another?
Here we motivate a variety of orderings by considering some basic modes in which an attacker can use observations to make deductions about the subject of a system: Facts A fact F is just a set of values. A given knowledge set X confirms fact F just when X ⊆ F . Dually, X has uncertainty F when F ⊆ X. For example a fact of interest (to an attacker) might be the set of "Platinum" card numbers.
In this case an observation might confirm to the attacker that a card is a Platinum card by also revealing exactly which platinum card it is. For a given K-space K we then say that -K can confirm F if there exists some X ∈ K such that X confirms F .
-K can have uncertainty F if there exists some X ∈ K such that X has uncertainty F . Queries A query Q is also just a set of values. We say that a given knowledge set X answers query Q just when either X ⊆ Q or X ⊆ V \ Q. For a given K-space K we then say that -K will answer Q if for all X ∈ K, X answers Q, and -K can answer Q if there exists some X ∈ K such that X answers Q.
In a possibilistic setting it is natural to focus on those "secrets" which it is impossible for a given system to reveal, where revealing a secret could mean either confirming a fact or answering a query. Two of the four K-space properties defined above have an immediate significance for this notion of secrecy:
-Say that S keeps fact F secret from attacker A iff there are no runs of S for which A's observation confirms F , i.e., iff: ¬(K S (A) can confirm F ). -Say that S keeps query Q secret from attacker A iff there are no runs of S for which A's observation answers Q, i.e., iff: ¬(K S (A) can answer Q).
The possibilistic secrecy significance of "has uncertainty" and "will answer" is not so clear. However, as we will show, we are able to define flow policies and a parameterized notion of policy satisfaction which behaves well with respect to all four properties. Using the ability of a K-space to confirm facts and answer queries, we can order systems in different ways, where a "smaller" K-space (ie one lower down in the ordering) allows the attacker to make more deductions (and so the system may be regarded as less secure). Define the following orderings between K-spaces:
Lower:
It is straightforward to verify that these orders are reflexive and transitive, but not anti-symmetric. The choice of names for the upper and lower orders is due to their correspondence with the powerdomain orderings [24] : Proposition 2.
We can compare the K-space orders 1) unconditionally, 2) as in the case of policy satisfaction, when we are comparing a partition with a K-space, and, 3) when the K-spaces are both partitions, yielding the following results:
2. Additionally, when P is a partition: P CA K ⇒ P WA K (the reverse implication does not hold in general). 3. ER , EM , L , and WA all coincide on partitions. Furthermore, when P 1 and P 2 are partitions: P 1 ER P 2 ⇒ P 1 U P 2 ⇒ P 1 CA P 2 (the reverse implications do not hold in general).
These orderings give us a variety of ways to extend the definition of policy satisfaction from functional systems (Equation 1) to the general case. The choice will depend on the type of security condition (eg protection of facts versus protection of queries) which we wish to impose.
The policy hierarchy
We specify a three-level hierarchy of erasure policy types. All three types of policy use a structured collection of equivalence relations on the subject domain to define what information should be erased. A key design principle is that, whenever a policy permits part of the erasure subject to be retained, this should be explicit, by which we mean that it should be captured by the conjunction of the component equivalence relations.
For each type of policy, we define a satisfaction relation, parameterized by a choice of K-space ordering o ∈ {U , L, EM , CA, WA}.
Assume a fixed policy subject function Φ : T → D. Given a subset V ⊆ D, let T V = {t ∈ T |Φ(t) ∈ V }. Note that if S belongs to Sys(V ) then S ⊆ T V .
Type 0 policies
Type 0 policies allow us to specify unconditional erasure, corresponding to the two examples shown in Section 2 in Listings 1.1 and 1.2.
A Type 0 erasure policy is just a visibility policy. We write Type-0(V ) for the set of all Type 0 policies for systems in Sys(V ) (thus Type-0(V ) = ER(V )). The definition of satisfaction for a given attacker model A and system S uses a Kspace ordering (specified by parameter o) to generalise the satisfaction relation of Equation 1 to arbitrary (i.e., not-necessarily functional) systems:
The subject domain is CC, the set of all credit card numbers, and (since the erasure subject is the initial input) the subject function is the first projection on traces. The policy we have in mind for this system is that it should erase all but the last four digits of the credit card number. We extend this example so that it uses a method call erased() to generate an explicit output event η (signalling that erasure should have taken place) followed by a dump of the program memory (thus revealing all retained information to a sufficiently strong attacker). If we restrict attention to systems (such as this one) where each run starts by inputting a credit card number and eventually outputs the erasure signal exactly once, we can assume a universe of traces T such that all t ∈ T have the form t =?cc.s.η.s ′ , where s, s ′ are sequences not including η. Let S be the trace model for the above system. The required visibility policy is the equivalence relation L4 ∈ ER(CC) which equates any two credit card numbers sharing the same last four digits. An appropriate attacker model is the attacker who sees nothing before the erasure event and everything afterwards. Call this the simple erasure attacker, denoted AS:
Informally, it should be clear that, for each run of the system, AS will learn the last four digits of the credit card which was input, together with some other log data (the transaction time) which is independent of the card number. Thus the knowledge set on a run, for example, where the card number ends 7016, would be the set of all card numbers ending 7016. The K-space in this example will actually be exactly the partition [L4], hence S does indeed satisfy the specified policy: S ⊢ o AS L4 for all choices of o. From now on, we write just S ⊢ A R to mean that it holds for all choices of ordering (or, equivalently, we can consider ⊢ A to be shorthand for ⊢ EM A , since EM is the strongest ordering).
Type 1 policies
Type 1 policies allow us to specify "low dependent" erasure (Section 2, Listing 1.3), where different amounts may be erased on different runs, but where the erasure condition is independent of the erasure subject itself. For systems in Sys(V ) the erasure condition is specified as a partition P ∈ PT(T V ). This is paired with a function f : P → Type-0(V ), which associates a Type 0 policy with each element of the partition. Since the domain of f is determined by the choice of P , we use a dependent type notation to specify the set of all Type 1 policies:
Because we want to allow only low dependency -i.e., the erasure condition must be independent of the erasure subject -we require that P is total for V , by which we mean:
This means that knowing the value of the condition will not in itself rule out any possible subject values. To define policy satisfaction we use the components X ∈ P to partition a system S into disjoint sub-systems S ∩ X and check both that each sub-system is defined over the whole subject domain V (again, to ensure low dependency) and that it satisfies the Type 0 policy for sub-domain X. So, for a Type 1 policy P, f ∈ Type-1(V ), an attacker model A, and system S ∈ Sys(V ), satisfaction is defined thus:
Example. Consider the example of Listing 1.3 extended with an erasure signal followed by a memory dump (as in our discussion of Type 0 policies above). Let S be the system model for the extended program. We specify a conditional erasure policy where the condition depends solely on the user choice. The erasure condition can be formalised as the partition Ch ∈ PT(T ) with two parts, one for traces where the user answers "Allow" (which we abbreviate to a) and one for traces where he doesn't: Ch = {Y, Y }, where Y = {t ∈ T |∃s, s 1 , s 2 . t = s.?a.s 1 .η.s 2 } and Y = T \ Y . For runs falling in the Y component, the intended visibility policy is L4, as in the Type 0 example above. For all other runs, the intended policy is All CC , specifying complete erasure. The Type 1 policy is thus Ch, g where g : Ch → ER(CC) is given by:
Intersecting Y and Y , respectively, with the system model S gives disjoint subsystems S Y (all the runs in which the user enters "Allow" to permit retention of the last four digits) and S Y (all the other runs). Since the user's erasure choice is input independently of the card number, it is easy to see that both sub-systems are in Sys(CC), that S Y ⊢ AS L4, and S Y ⊢ AS All. Thus S ⊢ AS Ch, g . The following theorem establishes that our "explicitness" design principle is realised by Type 1 policies:
Example. Consider instantiating the theorem to the policy Ch, g described above. Here the policy is built from the two equivalence relations All and L4; the theorem tells us that the knowledge of the attacker is bounded by the meet of these components (and hence nothing that is not an explicit part of the policy) i.e., All ∧ L4, which is equivalent to just L4.
Type 2 policies
Type 2 policies are the most flexible policies we consider, allowing dependency on both the erasure subject and other properties of a run.
Recall the motivating example from Section 2 (Listing 1.4) in which credit card numbers in a particular set (the StealthCards) SC ⊆ CC are always erased, while the user is given some choice for other card numbers. In this example, the dependency of the policy on the erasure subject can be modelled by the partition HC = {SC, SC}. For each of these two cases, we can specify sub-policies which apply only to card numbers in the corresponding subsets. Since these sub-policies do not involve any further dependence on the erasure subject, they can both be formulated as Type 1 policies for their respective sub-domains. In general then, we define the Type 2 policies as follows:
To define satisfaction for Type 2 policies, we use the components W ∈ Q to partition a system S into sub-systems (unlike the analogous situation with Type 1 policies, we cannot intersect S directly with W ; instead, we intersect with T W ). To ensure that the only dependency on the erasure subject is that described by Q, we require that each sub-system S ∩ T W is defined over the whole of the subject sub-domain W . So, for a Type 2 policy Q, g ∈ Type-2(V ), an attacker model A, and system S ∈ Sys(V ), satisfaction is defined thus:
To state the appropriate analogue of Theorem 1 we need to form a conjunction of all the component parts of a Type 2 policy: -In the worst case, the attacker will be able to observe which of the erasure cases specified by Q contains the subject, hence we should conjoin the corresponding equivalence relation E(Q). -Each Type 1 sub-policy determines a worst case equivalence relation, as defined in Theorem 1. To conjoin these relations, we must first extend each one from its sub-domain to the whole domain, by appending a single additional equivalence class comprising all the "missing" elements: given W ⊆ V and
Theorem 2. Let Q, g ∈ Type-2(V ) and S ∈ Sys(V ) and A ∈ ER(T ). For any Type 1 policy P, f , let
Example We consider a Type 2 policy satisfied by Listing 1.4, namely HC, h where HC is the partition into Stealth and non-Stealth cards (as above), and h is defined as follows.
The term T SC denotes the set of traces which input a Stealth card number as first action. As in the example of Type 1 policy above, Y is the set of (nonstealth) traces where the user gives permission ("Yes") to retain the last digits, Y is its complement (relative to the set of non-stealth traces), and Ch is the partition {Y, Y }. The term L4 SC denotes the restriction of L4 to elements in SC. Instantiating Theorem 2 to this example tells us that the attacker knowledge is bounded by E(HC) ∧ All †
, which is just L4 † SC .
Varying the attacker model
The hierarchy deals with erasure policies independently of any particular attacker model. Here we make some brief remarks about modelling attackers. Let us take the example of the erasure notion studied in [17] where the systems are simple imperative programs involving IO on public and secret channels. Then the implicit attacker model in that work is unable to observe any IO events prior to the erasure point, and is able to observe just the public inputs and outputs thereafter. (We note that [17] also considers a policy enforcement mechanism which uses a stronger, state-based non-interference property.) Now consider the example of the one-time pad described in the introduction, codified in Listing 1.6. Let system S be the set of traces modelling the possible runs of the program and let the subject be the first input in each trace. For the simple erasure attacker AS (Section 4), unable to observe the key provided in line 2, the K-space will be {V } = [All], hence S ⊢ AS All. This is because the value of data in the output does not inform the attacker about the initial value.
1 g e t ( d a t a ) ; 2 g e t ( k e y ) ; 3 
On the other hand, the attacker who can also observe the key learns everything about the data from its encrypted value. 4 So for this stronger attacker, using encryption to achieve erasure does not work, and indeed policy satisfaction fails for this particular system.
If the attacker is strengthened even further, we arrive at a point where no system will be able to satisfy the policy. Intuitively, if an attacker can see the erasure subject itself (or, more specifically, more of the erasure subject than the policy permits to be retained) no system will be able to satisfy the policy. In general, we say that a policy p with subject domain V (where p may be of any of Types 0,1,2) is weakly o-compatible with attacker model A iff there exists S ∈ Sys(V ) such that S ⊢ o A p (we call this weak compatibility because it assumes that all S ∈ Sys(V ) are of interest but in general there will be additional constraints on the admissible systems). Clearly, to be helpful as a sanity check on policies we need something a little more constructive than this. For the special case of Type 0 policies and the upper ordering we have the following characterisation:
Deriving analogues of this result (or at least sufficient conditions) of more general applicability remains a subject for further work.
Finally, we note that, while our main aim has been to specify erasure policies, by varying the attacker model appropriately, we can specify quite general information-flow properties, not just erasure policies. For example, by classifying events into High and Low and defining the attacker who sees only Low events, we can specify non-interference properties.
Related work
We consider related work both directly concerned with erasure and more generally with knowledge based approaches to information flow policies.
Erasure The information-flow perspective on erasure was introduced by Chong and Myers [7] and was studied in combination with confidentiality and declassification. Their semantics is based on an adaptation of two-run noninterference definitions, and does not have a clear attacker model. They describe conditional erasure policies where the condition is independent of the data to be erased. Although this appears similar to Type 1 policies (restricted to total erasure), it is more accurately viewed as a form of Type 0 policy in which the condition defines the point in the trace from which the attacker begins observation.
The present paper does not model the behaviour of the user who interacts with an erasing system. This was studied in [14] for one particular system and attacker model. We believe that it would be possible to extend the system model with a user-strategy parameter (see [30, 23, 23] which consider explicit models of user strategies). Neither do we consider here the verification or enforcement of erasure policies; for specific systems and attacker models this has been studied in a programming language context in [17, 8, 9, 13, 22] .
Knowledge based approaches Our use of knowledge sets was inspired by Askarov and Sabelfeld's gradual release definitions [2] . This provides a clear attacker-oriented perspective on information-flow properties based on what an attacker can deduce about a secret after making observations. A number of recent papers have followed this approach to provide semantics for richer information flow properties, e.g. [4, 5] . Our use of knowledge sets to build a K-space, thus generalising the use of equivalence relations/partitions, is new. The use of partitions in expressing a variety of information flow properties was studied in early work by Cohen [10] . The use of equivalence relations and more generally partial equivalence relations as models for information and information flow was studied in [19] and resp. [26] .
Recent work [3] uses an epistemic temporal logic as a specification language for information flow policies. Formulae are interpreted over trace-based models of programs in a simple sequential while language (without input actions), together with an explicit observer defined via an observation function on traces. Our work looks very similar in spirit to [3] , though this requires further investigation, and it appears that our modelling capabilities are comparable. The use of temporal logic in [3] is attractive, for example because of the possibility of using off the shelf model-checking tools. However, our policy language allows a more intuitive reading and clear representation of the information leakage.
Alur et al [1] , study preservation of secrecy under refinement. The information flow model of that work bears a number of similarities with the present work. Differences include a more concrete treatment of traces, and a more abstract treatment of secrets. As here, equivalence relations are used to model an attacker's observational power, while knowledge models the ability of an attacker to determine the value of trace predicates. Their core definition of secrecy coincides with what we call secrecy of queries (viz., negation of "can answer"), although they do not consider counterparts to our other knowledge-based properties.
Abstract Non-Interference Abstract Non-Interference [16] has strong similarities with our use of K-spaces. In abstract non-interference, upper closure operators (uco's) are used to specify non-interference properties. The similarities with the current work become apparent when a uco is presented as a Moore family, which may be seen as a K-space closed under intersection.
[16] starts by defining the intuitive notion of narrow abstract non-interference (NANI) parameterized by two upper closure operators η (specifying what the attacker can observe of low inputs) and ρ (ditto low outputs). A weakness of NANI is that it suffers from "deceptive flows", whereby a program failing to satisfy NANI might still be non-interfering. From our perspective, the deceptive flows problem arises because η fails to distinguish between what an attacker can observe of low inputs and what he should be allowed to deduce about them (i.e., everything). Since we specify the attacker model independently from the flow policy, the deceptive flows problem does not arise for us.
The deceptive flows problem is addressed in [16] by defining a more general notion of abstract non-interference (ANI) which introduces a third uco parameter φ. The definition of ANI adapts that of NANI by lifting the semantics of a program to an abstract version in which low inputs are abstracted by η and high inputs by φ. A potential criticism of this approach is that an intuitive reading is not clear, since it is based on an abstraction of the original program semantics. On the other hand, being based on Abstract Interpretation [12, 11] , abstract noninterference has the potential to leverage very well developed theory and static analysis algorithms for policy checking and enforcement. It would therefore be useful to explore the connections further and to attempt an analysis of the ANI definitions (see also additional variants in [20] ) relating them to more intuitive properties based on knowledge sets. A starting point could be [18] which provides an alternative characterisation of NANI using equivalence relations.
Provenance A recent abstract model of information provenance [6] is built on an information-flow foundation and has a number of similarities with our model, including a focus on an observer model as an equivalence relation, and a knowledge-based approach described in terms of queries that an observer can answer. Provenance is primarily concerned with a providing sufficient information to answer provenance-related questions. In secrecy and erasure one is concerned with not providing more than a certain amount.
Conclusions and further work
We have presented a rich, knowledge-based abstract framework for erasure policy specification, taking into account both quantitative and conditional aspects of the problem. Our model includes an explicit representation of the attacker. The knowledge-based approach guarantees an intuitive understanding of what it means for an attacker to deduce some information about the secret, and for a policy to provide an upper bound to these deductions.
Our work so far suggests a number of possible extensions. At this stage, the most relevant ones on the theoretical side are:
-Develop a logic defined on traces, both to support policy definition and to give the basis for an enforcement mechanism (as is done in [3] ). -Model multilevel erasure, based on the fact the attacker might perform observations up-to a certain level in the security lattice. It would be interesting to investigate different classes of such attackers and to analyse their properties. -Generalise policy specifications to use K-spaces in place of equivalence relations. This would allow specification of disjunctive policies such as "reveal the key or the ciphertext, but not both". Non-ER policies may also be more appropriate for protection of facts, rather than queries, since ER's are effectively closed under complementation and so cannot reveal a fact without also revealing its negation (for example, we may be prepared to reveal "not HIV positive" to an insurance company, but not the negation of this fact). -Extend the scope of the approach along the following key dimensions (defined in the same spirit as [27] ): What: Our model is possibilistic but it is well known that possibilistic security guarantees can be very weak when non-determinism is resolved probabilistically (see the example in Section 5 of [25] ). A probabilistic approach would be more expressive and provide stronger guarantees. When: Our policies support history-based erasure conditions but many scenarios require reasoning about the future ("erase this account in 3 weeks"). This would require a richer semantic setting in which time is modelled more explicitly. Who: We do not explicitly model the user's behaviour but it is implicit in our possibilistic approach that the user behaves non-deterministically and, in particular, that later inputs are chosen independently of the erasure subject. Modelling user behaviour explicitly would allow us to relax this assumption (which is not realistic in all scenarios) and also to model active attackers. -Understand the interplay between erasure and cryptographic concepts. To make this possible some refinements of the theory are needed. Firstly, it would be natural to move to a probabilistic system model. Secondly, the present notion of knowledge assumes an attacker with computationally unlimited deductive power; instead we would need a notion of feasibly computable knowledge.
